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MERRILL W. REED, KEITH REED, 
GEORGA REED AND JOHN DOES 
1 THROUGH 15, 
Defendants/Appellants. 
Case No. 890446 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF ^ROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from an Order arid Judgment concerning a 
Motion to Quash Service. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. Section 78-2a-3 (1986 amended). 
ISSUE PRESENTED 
Whether a trial court erred in denying the Defendant's 
Motion to Quash Service given that the sjervice was delivered at 
the residence of the Defendant's parents ^nd not the residence of 
the Defendant. 
DETERMINATIVE RULES 
Rule 4(e)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states: 
(e) Personal service in state. Personal service within 
the state shall be as follows: 
(1) Upon a natural person of the age of 14 
years or over, by delivering a copy thereof 
to him personally, or by leaving such copy at 
this usual place of abode with some person of 
suitable age and discretion there residing; 
or by delivering a copy to an agent 
authorized by appointment or by law to 
receive service of process. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case and Course of the Proceedings. 
This appeal is from the ruling of Judge Cullen Y. 
Christensen dated October 3, 1988 and from the amended default 
judgment against Keith Reed only, dated November 2, 1988. The 
Order and Judgment resolving the issues between the other 
litigants in the matter was signed by the Honorable Cullen Y. 
Christensen on July 11, 1989. A Motion for Amendment of Judgment 
under Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure was filed by 
the Plaintiff against the Defendants Merrill W. Reed and Georga 
Reed on June 20, 1989 with the response being filed by Georga 
Reed and Merrill Reed on July 5, 1989. No decision has been 
entered on the Motion to Amend the Judgment. But that Motion 
does not affect the determination of the Court relative to Keith 
Reed's Motion to Quash Service. 
The Appellant, Keith Reed, appeals from the Court's ruling 
2 
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their son had left the State of Utah (Addendum A). 
The Plaintiff and the Defendant were separated some time 
during June 1986, and were divorced on or about April 15, 1987. 
(Addendum A, paragraph 4). Thereafter, the Plaintiff claim to 
have seen the Defendant a couple of times during May 1988, at 
which time the Defendant was allegedly driving a pickup truck 
purportedly owned by his parents (Addendum A, paragraph 5). 
Treasa Norton, the daughter of the Plaintiff and the Defendant 
also claimed to have seen the Defendant once at the end of April 
1988 under similar circumstances (Addendum A, paragraph 5). 
The parents of the Defendant reside at 254 North 300 East, 
Orem, Utah 84057 (Addendum A, paragraph 7). Some time prior to 
April 15 of 1987 and 1988, the Defendant listed his parents' 
address on his income tax returns. (Addendum A, paragraph 9). 
The trial court found that the Defendant became aware of the 
service of process about a month after his parents were served. 
(Addendum A, paragraph 10). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred in denying the Defendant's Motion to 
Quash Service and in ordering default judgment against the 
Defendant for several reasons. First, according to the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure and Utah case law, it is proper 
compliance with the formalities of process is a prerequisite to 
4 
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court should be reversed and the Defendant should be allowed to 
defend himself in this action. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
TO QUASH SERVICE BECAUSE THAT SERVICE WAS MADE UPON 
THE DEFENDANT'S PARENTS AND NOT UPON THE DEFENDANT. 
A. Proper compliance with the formalities of service is a 
prerequisite to invoking jurisdiction of a court and to 
acquiring jurisdiction over a defendant. 
It is one of the most fundamental rules of civil procedure 
that before any court can exercise jurisdiction over a party, 
there must be proper issuance and service of summons. Murdock v. 
Blake, 402 P.2d 164 (Utah 1971) Utah Sand and Gravel Products v. 
Tolbert, 402 P. 2d 703 (Utah 1965); Lloyd v. Third Judicial 
District Court, 495 P.2d 1262 (Utah 1972). The Utah Supreme 
Court summarized the importance of proper service as follows: 
the proper issuance and service of a summons which is 
the means of invoking the jurisdiction of the court and 
of acquiring jurisdiction of the defendant is the 
foundation of the lawsuit. Utah Sand and Gravel 
Products v. Tolbert, 402 P.2d 703 (Utah 1965). 
Rule 4(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure outlines the 
requisites of proper service that are applicable in the present 
case. Rule 4(e) provides that process may be validly served upon 
an individual 
by delivering a copy to him personally, or leaving such 
copy [i.e., copy of the summons and complaint] at his 
usual place of abode with some person of suitable age 
and discretion there residing. Utah R. Civ. P. 4(e). 
6 
Without proper service in the present case, the court would 
have no jurisdiction over the Defendant except to uphold his 
motion to quash the attempted service. 
B. The residence of the Defendant's parents did not 
constitute the Defendant's "usual place of abode" 
required by Rule 4(e), 
The Defendant in the present case ioes not assert that his 
parents are not of suitable age and discretion, but rather, that 
the Defendant's "usual place of abode" was not his parents' 
residence at the time service was attempted. Thus, it is 
necessary to determine what is meant by jthe term "usual place of 
abode" as set forth in Rule 4(e). bne of the Plaintiff's 
arguments is that since the Defendant Hi his parents' address 
on his income tax forms, this is sufficient to constitute the 
Defendant's "usual place of abode." However, at the time the 
Sheriff left the Summons and Complaint at the parent's residence, 
the parents informed the Sheriff that th^ Defendant did not live 
there. Moreover, the Affidavits taken in the course of these 
proceedings affirm that the Defendant Was not living at his 
parent's home when the service was maae. In Stan Katz Real 
Estate Inc. v. Chavez, 565 P.2c 1142, Justice Crockett emphasized 
the seriousness which should be given ^o affidavit testimony: 
It is my view that the defendant's statement in his 
affidavit under oath that he did not reside at that 
address and had not received thp summons stands 
7 
unrefuted. 
Thus, it seems that while the parent's residence may have 
been the Defendant's last known address according to his income 
tax forms, it was not his present address at the time service was 
attempted. 
In delineating what is required for proper service, the Utah 
Supreme Court explained that delivering summons to a person's 
last known address does no satisfy the requirement: 
Neither 'Notice of the Action' nor summons mailed to 
the defendant at his last known address will give 
jurisdiction over the defendant." Lloyd v. Third 
Judicial District Court, 495 P.2d 1262 (Utah 1972). 
Thus, merely leaving a copy of the Summons and the Complaint 
at the parent's residence was not sufficient; particularly since 
the Defendant's parents explained that the Defendant no longer 
lived with them. The only possible way this service would have 
been valid is if the Defendant's parents were agents of the 
Defendant appointed to receive service for him which they were 
not. Garcia v. Garcia, 712 P.2d 288 (Utah 1986). In sum, while 
the question of whether a party has been served with process is a 
question of fact, Carnes v. Carnes, 668 P.2d 555 (Utah 1983), the 
facts in the present case show that the personal service 
attempted on the Defendant was unsuccessful. 
C. The fact that the pefendant may have had "Notice of the 
Present Action" does not remove the formal requirements 
for proper service. 
8 
The Supreme Court of Utah in Murdock v. Blake, 484 P.2d 164 
(Utah 1971), explained the importance of complying with the 
requirements of personal service whether or not the party to be 
served has actual knowledge of the actioii. 
for it is service of process, not actual 
knowledge of the commencement of the action, which 
confers jurisdiction. Otherwise, a defendant could 
never object to the sufficiency of service of process, 
since he must have knowledge of th£ suit to make such 
objection. The proper issuance and 
cannot be supplanted by mer^ notice by letter, 
service of summons 
telephone or any other such means. [emphasis added) 
Id. at 167. 
Using the Supreme Court's reasoning in Blake, the attempted 
service on the Defendant cannot be deemed proper merely because 
he may have found out about the action iri some other way, such as 
hearing the news from his parents. Certainly, xhe news of a 
summon would travel like wildfire, espebially within a family, 
but the rules of civil procedure do not rely and indeed, refuse 
to rely on such a haphazard method of infprming parties that they 
are being sued. The Utah Supreme Court i^as echoed this argument 
in other cases. Lloyd v. Third Judicial District Court, 495 P.2c 
1262 (Utah 1972); Utah Sand & Gravel Products Corp. v. Tolbert, 
402 P.2d 703 (Utah 1965). 
D. Alternative means should have b^en used to give proper 
notice to the Defendant when the attempt at personal 
service failed. 
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In Guenther v. Guenther, 749 P.2d 628 (Utah 1988), the Utah 
Supreme Court discussed possible alternatives for giving proper 
notice to parties who could not be personally served. The facts 
of Guenther are relevant to the facts of the present case. In 
Guenther, the defendant had resided at his mother's home. Id. 
at 630. However, when the Sheriff attempted personal service on 
the defendant at his mother's residence, the defendant's mother 
said that she did not have an address for him and that she did 
not know of his whereabouts. Id. Following the Sheriff's 
unsuccessful attempts to serve the defendant personally, the 
court permitted service by publication and by mailing a copy of 
the summons to the defendant's last known address. Id. The 
Guenther court, stated that the state had an interest in allowing 
the plaintiffs to obtain jurisdiction over defendant's who were 
in the state, but could not be found and personally served. Id. 
at 629. In furthering that interest, the court gave guidelines 
for plaintiffs who were unsuccessful in their attempts at 
personal service: 
. . . following [the] Sheriff's unsuccessful attempts 
to serve [the] defendant over [an] extended period of 
time plaintiff was entitled to move for and obtain an 
order authorizing service of [the] summons on [the] 
defendant by publication and by mailing copies of 
[the] summons to him at his last known address. 
Id. Thus, the law has provided effective methods to serve 
process on difficult-to-find defendants. However, the Plaintiffs 
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in the present case did no follow any of the alternative methods 
provided. First, the record did not show that the attempts of 
personal service on the defendant took place over an "extended 
period of time." Second, the Plaintiff did not even attempt to 
obtain an order allowing for publication and service by mail. 
In sum, the records and the affidavits taken support the 
claim that the Defendant was not residing at his parent's 
residence when personal service was attempted. Therefore, the 
attempted personal service was invalid. The only other 
alternative for the Plaintiff was to obtain the Court's 
permission to serve the Defendant by publication which they did 
not do. Accordingly, the Defendant's Mprion to Quash should be 
upheld. 
CONCLUSION 
Proper compliance with the requisites of service of process 
are fundamental to a court's exercise of jurisdiction. The 
method of service outlined in the Rules 0f Civil Procedure is to 
personally serve a defendant by leaving ^ copy of the summons at 
the person's "usual place of abode." Thp Plaintiff's service at 
the residence of the Defendant's parents did not fulfill this 
requirement. Moreover, Utah case law does not support the 
argument that the requirements for personal service are waived 
merely because the person to be served still receives actual 
11 
notice. Finally, the Plaintiff did not follow any of the means 
provided to properly serve the Defendant after her unsuccessful 
attempt at personal service. 
Therefore, the Defendant-Appellant respectfully requests 
that the portion of the trial court's order and judgment denying 
Defendant's Motion to Quash Service and the resulting default 
judgment be reversed. 
DATED this ^ day of December, 1989. 
CJ X? 
RICHARD B. JOHNSON, ESQ 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the (p day of December, 1989, 
I caused to be deposited in the mail four (4) true and correct 
copies of the foregoing to the following, postage prepaid. 
Glen J. Ellis, Esq. 
ELLIS & ELLIS 
60 East 100 South, Suite 102 
P.O. Box 1097 
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MERRILL W. REED, et al., 
Defendants• 
dase. No. CV-88-927 
RULING 
This matter comes before the Court, under Rule 2.8, 
on the motion of defendant Keith Reed seeking an order 
quashing the service of process u^ >on him. The Court has 
reviewed the file, considered the memoranda of counsel, 
entertained the proffers and argument of counsel, and upon 
being advised i:i the premises, noy makes the following: 
FINDINGS 
1. Merrill W. Reed and fceorga Reed are the parents 
of Keith Reed. 
2. Keith Reed was purportedly served on May 8, 
1988, with process by leaving the same with said parents 
under the assumption that the residence of the parents was 
"the usual place of abode1' of Keith Reed (Rule 4(e) (l)URCP.) ; 
that said parents have disavowed any knowledge of the where-
abouts of Keith Reed. 
3. Defendants, by affidavit, have affirmed that 
at the time of the purported service, Keith Reed did not 
reside with his parents; that said parents have claimed that 
Keith Reed had left the State of Utah (Norton affidavit). 
4. That plaintiff and defendant Keith Reed were 
divorced on or about April 15, 1987; that said parties 
separated during or about the month of June, 1986. 
5. That plaintiff personally observed Keith Reed 
in Provo, Utah on May 7, 1988, driving a 1976 Ford pickup 
truck which truck said parents claim to own, and which truck 
is one of the subjects of controversy in this action; that 
plaintiff again personally observed Keith Reed in Provo, 
Utah on May 12, 1988. 
6. That Keith Reed was personally seen in the 
vicinity of Orem, Utah on April 26, 1988 by Treasa Norton, 
daughter of the plaintiff, and Keith Reed was at said time 
driving said truck. 
7. That the said parents of Keith Reed reside at 
254 North 300 East, Orem, Utah 84057. 
8. That sometime prior to April 15, 1987, Keith 
Reed filed income tax returns for the year 1986 upon which 
his address was stated as being 254 North 300 East, Orem, 
Utah 84057. 
9. That sometime prior to April 15, 1988 and after 
February 5, 1988, the said Keith Reed filed income tax 
returns for the year 1986 upon which his address was stated 
as being 254 North 300 East, OremJ Utah 84057. 
10. That no la ter than 4^ne 8, 1988, Keith Reed 
became #ware of the process served upon h i s parents on May 
8, 1988, 
DISCUSSION 
The Court is of the view that "domicile11 and "usual 
place of abode11 for the purposes pf the service of process 
are not synonymous. 
As stated in Grant vs. Lawrence, 37 Ut. 450, 108 
P.931, 
"Usual place of abode is sometimes referred to as 
being synonymous with domicile or permanent residence. 
In our judgment there is a btoad distinction between 
domicile and usual place of ^bode as the latter term 
is used in our statute. Suclji also seems to be the 
conclusion reached by the authorities. . . 
That is, where a person Abides -- lives -- at the 
particular time when the summons is served, constitutes 
his usual place of abode. A similar question was before 
the Supreme Court of the United States in Earle v. 
McVeigh, 91 U.S., where at pige 508 (23 L. Ed. 398), 
it is held that, "usual plac^ of abode," such service, 
in order to constitute legal service, must be made at 
the defendant's "then present residence." In other 
words, at the place where th£ defendant then lives or 
abides. . ." 
It thus becomes a question of fact to be determined 
by the Court (Carnes vs. Carnes, 668 P.2d 555) and for which 
purpose tYte evidentiary hearing ox September 26, 19&& \*as 
convened. 
However, as further stated in Carnes, Supra: 
"Although a sheriff's return of process is presumptively 
correct and is prima facie evidence of the facts stated 
therein, the invalidity or absence of service of process 
can be shown by clear and convincing evidence," 
and as stated in Guenther vs. Guenther, 749 P. 2d 628, in a 
situation somewhat analogous to the one now before the Court: 
"Defendant's interest to be appraised of the pendency 
of the action against him by personal service upon him 
is outweighed by the state's interest that persons 
using the state's courts, such as plaintiff, be allowed 
to maintain their actions and obtain jurisdiction over 
defendants who are in the state but who cannot after 
the exercise of due diligence, be found and personally 
served.11 
It also appears to the Court that the Rules with 
respect to service of process are to be liberally construed 
to insure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of 
every action, as long as a party is actually apprised of the 
pendency of an action (Rule 1(a) URCP). 
In the case of Nowell vs. Nowell, 384 F.2d 951, 
32 ALR 3rd 107, the Fifth Federal Circuit Court in construing 
similar language of "dwelling house or usual place of abode" 
under the Federal Rules stated: 
"The appropriate construction of Rule 4(d)(1) varies 
according to whether the defendant received notice of 
the suit. 4(d)(1) should be broadly construed where 
the defendant, as in this case, received notice of the 
suit. This rule of construction is, of course, subject 
to the limitation that the construction of the statute's 
language must be a natural rather than an artificial 
one. Frasca vs. Eubank. DC Pa. 1959, 24 FRD 268. Other-
vise, no hard and fast rule can be fashioned to determine 
what is or is not a party's 'dwelling house or usual 
place of abode1 within the nklefs meaning; rather the 
practicalities of the particular fact situation determine 
whether service meets the requirements of 4(d)(1). 
11
. . . the provision concerning usual place of abode 
should be liberally construed to effectuate service if 
actual notice has been received by the defendant and 
that in the last analysis th$ question of service must 
be resolved by 'what best selves to give notice to a 
defendant that he is being served with process, con-
sidering the situation from a practical standpoint.' 
u
. . . ftovins^i vs. ftowe, C.C.A.feth 19U2, 133 1131} 
F.2d 687 . . . ." 
Based upon the foregoing, the Court further finds 
and concludes as follows: 
11. Defendant has not ptoduced clear and convincing 
evidence to overcome the presumptively correct service of 
process. 
12. That defendant has been fully apprised of the 
pendency of the proceedings against him. 
13. That a just, speedy and inexpensive deter-
mination of this action dictates tfhat defendant should be 
required to answer the complaint cj>f the plaintiff. 
14. That defendants motion to quash should be 
denied. 
RULING 
15. That defendant's motion to quash service of 
process be and the same is hereby denied. 
Dated thisj^^^ day of October 1988. 
BY THE COURT: 
Culllen^T Christensen, Judge 
